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Abstract
This paper studies equilibria of second price auctions when valuations and participation
costs are both private information with general distribution functions. We consider the exis-
tence and uniqueness of equilibrium in this general framework of two-dimensional types. It
is shown that there always exists an equilibrium, and further there exists a unique symmetric
equilibrium when all bidders are ex ante homogeneous. Moreover, we identify a sufficient
condition under which there is a unique equilibrium in a heterogeneous economy with two
bidders. Our general result includes many existing results as special cases.
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1 Introduction
While an auction is an effective way to exploit private information by increasing the competition
among buyers and thus can increase allocation efficiency, it is not freely implemented actually.
In order to participate, bidders may have to incur some participation costs1 that arise from
∗The authors would like to thank the financial supports from the National Natural Science Foundation
of China, NSFC-71201030 and NSFC-71371117, respectively. Authors’ email addresses: Xiaoyong Cao: y-
ongcx2000@uibe.edu.cn; Guoqiang Tian: tian@econmail.tamu.edu.
1Some related terminology includes participation cost, participation fee, entry cost or opportunity cost. See
Laffont and Green (1984), Samuelson (1986), McAfee and McMillan (1987), Harstad (1990), Levin and Smith
(1994), etc.
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many sources. For instance, sellers may require that bidders pay some participation fee; bidders
themselves may have transportation costs to go to an auction spot; or they need spend some
money to learn the rules of the auction and how to submit bids. Bidders may even have
opportunity costs to attend an auction.
With participation costs, not all bidders are willing to participate. If a bidder’s expected
revenue from participating in the auction is less than the participation cost, he will not partici-
pate. Otherwise, the bidder participates and submits a bid accordingly. Even if a bidder decides
to participate in an auction, since he may expect some other bidders will not participate in the
auction, his bidding behavior may not be the same as that in the standard auction without
participation costs.
The study of participation costs in auctions mainly focuses on second price auctions due
to the simplicity of bidding behavior. In a standard second price auction, bidding one’s true
valuation is a weakly dominant strategy. There are also other equilibria in the standard second
price auction as shown in Blume and Heidhues (2004); for example, the bidder with the highest
value bids his true value and all others bid zero. This is referred to as the asymmetric bidding
equilibrium in the standard second price auction. However, he cannot do better than bidding
his true value. This is also true in second price auctions in the presence of participation costs.
Therefore in this paper we only consider equilibria in which each bidder uses a cutoff strategy;
i.e., bids his true value if participation is optimal, and does not participate otherwise.
Laffont and Green (1984) were the first to study the second price auction with participation
costs when bidders’ valuations and participation costs are both private information. However,
their proof on the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium is problematic.They applied the Ba-
nach fixed-point theorem (also known as the contraction mapping theorem or contraction map-
ping principle) to show the existence and uniqueness result, however the condition for applying
the theorem is not satisfied.2 In fact, the study on equilibria in mechanism design in general and
auction design in particular is much harder and more complicated than they thought in the set-
ting of multiple dimensional types due to the lack of a natural order on types. As such, one then
turns to studying the existence of equilibria in a unidimensional economic environment where
either valuations or participation costs are private information, such those studies in Campbell
(1998), Tan and Yilankaya (2006), Cao and Tian (2010). Besides, Laffont and Green (1984)
imposed a restrictive assumption that values and participation costs are uniformly distributed.
Campbell (1998) and Tan and Yilankaya (2006) studied the existence of equilibria in second
2See details in the Appendix B.
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price auction in an economic environment when bidders’ values are private information and
participation costs are common knowledge and the same. They found that asymmetric equi-
libria may exist when bidders are ex ante homogeneous. Uniqueness of the equilibrium cannot
be guaranteed. Some other studies, including Samuelson (1985), Stegeman (1996), Levin and
Smith (1994), etc, also assumed that participation costs are the same across players. While
the assumption of equal participation costs is stringent and unrealistic, Cao and Tian (2013)
investigated the equilibria when bidders may have differentiated participation costs. They in-
troduced the notions of monotonic equilibrium and non-monotonic equilibrium. Cao and Tian
(2010) studied similar problems for first price auction in an economic environment with equal
participation costs. On the other hand, Kaplan and Sela (2006) simplified the framework of
Laffont and Green in another way. They studied equilibria of second price auctions with partic-
ipation costs when bidders’ participation costs are private information and are drawn from the
same distribution function, while valuations are common knowledge.
The existence of equilibria in second price auctions with privately-informed valuations and
participation costs then remains unanswered. This paper aims to fill the gap. We consider the
existence and uniqueness of (Bayesian-Nash) equilibria in sealed-bid second price, or Vickrey
auctions with bidder participation costs in a general two-dimensional economic environment.
Special cases of this general specification include that either the valuations or participation
costs are common knowledge, as those having been investigated in the existing literature.
Under a general two-dimensional distribution of the bidders’ participation costs and valua-
tions we prove that equilibria always exist, and further there exists a unique symmetric equi-
librium when all bidders are ex ante homogeneous (i.e., bidders have the same distributions).
Moreover, we identify the conditions under which we have a unique equilibrium (as such, there
is no asymmetric equilibrium) in a simple two-bidder economy. Special cases where multiple
equilibria may exist are also discussed. There may exist an equilibrium in which one bidder
never participates or an equilibrium in which one bidder always participates.
Thus, our general framework establishes the existence of equilibrium and uniqueness of sym-
metric equilibrium not only in the two-dimensional uniform setting as studied in Laffont and
Green (1984), but also in many other two-dimensional settings such as truncated normal dis-
tributions, exponential distributions, etc. Moreover, our framework can deal with asymmetric
equilibria as considered in literature with one-dimensional private information, such as those in
Campbell (1998), Tan and Yilankaya (2006) and Cao and Tian (2013).
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes a general setting of
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economic environments. Section 3 establishes the existence of equilibrium. The uniqueness
of equilibrium is discussed in Section 4. In Section 5 we give a brief discussion on multiple
equilibria. Concluding remarks are provided in Section 6. All the proofs are in appendix A.
2 The Setup
We consider an independent value economic environment with one seller and n buyers. Let
N = {1, 2, . . . , n}. The seller has an indivisible object which he values at zero to sell to one
of the buyers. The auction format is the sealed-bid second price auction (see Vickrey, 1961).
In order to submit a bid, bidder i must pay a participation cost ci. Buyer i’s value for the
object, vi, and participation cost ci are private and independently drawn from the distribution
function Ki(vi, ci) with the support [0, 1]× [0, 1]. Let ki(vi, ci) denote the corresponding density
function. In particular, when vi and ci are independent, we have Ki(vi, ci) = Fi(vi)Gi(ci)
and ki(vi, ci) = fi(vi)gi(ci), where Fi(vi) and Gi(ci) are the cumulative distribution functions
of bidder i’s valuation and participation cost, fi(vi) and gi(ci)
3 are the corresponding density
functions.
Each bidder knows his own value and participation cost before he makes his entrance decision
and does not know others’ decisions when he makes his own. If bidder i decides to participate in
the auction, he pays a non-refundable participation cost ci and submits a bid. The bidder with
the highest bid wins the object and pays the second highest bid. If there is only one person in
the auction, he wins the object and pays 0. If there is a tie, the allocation is determined by a
fair lottery. The bidder who wins the object pays his own bid.
In this second price auction mechanism with participation costs, the individually rational
action set for any type of bidder is :{No} ∪ (0, 1]4, where “{No}” denotes not participating in
the auction. Bidder i incurs the participation cost if and only if his action is different from
“{No}”. Bidders are risk neutral and they will compare the expected payoffs from participating
with participation costs to decide whether or not to participate. If the expected payoff from
participating is less than the costs, they will not participate. Otherwise, they will participate
and submit bids. Further if a bidder finds participating in this second price auction optimal,
he cannot do better than bidding his true valuation (i.e., bidding his true value is a weakly
3When vi or ci takes discrete values, their density functions fi(v) and gi(ci) are reduced to the discrete
probability distribution functions, which can be represented by the Dirac delta function. The density at the
discrete point is infinity.
4For completeness, we assume a bidder with valuation 0 and participation cost 0 does not participate in the
auction. The strategy of {No} will be denoted by 0.
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dominant strategy).5
Given the equilibrium strategies of all others, a bidder’s expected payoff from participating
in the auction is a non-decreasing function of his valuation. Putting it differently, the maximum
one would like to pay to participate in an auction is a non-decreasing function of his valuation.
Therefore, we can focus on Bayesian-Nash equilibria in which each bidder uses a cutoff strategy6
denoted by c∗i (vi), i.e., one bids his true valuation if his participation cost is less than some cutoff
and does not participate otherwise. An equilibrium strategy of each bidder i is then determined
by the expected payoff of participating in the auction c∗i (vi) when his value is vi
7. Let bi(vi, ci)
denote bidder i’s strategy. Then the bidding decision function can be characterized by
bi(vi, ci) =
 vi if 0 ≤ ci ≤ c∗i (vi)No otherwise.
Remark 1 At an equilibrium, c∗i (vi) > 0 is a cost cutoff (critical) point such that individual i
is indifferent from participating in the auction or not. Bidder i will participate in the auction
whenever 0 < ci ≤ c∗i (vi). Note that at equilibrium, we have c∗i (vi) ≤ vi.
The description of the equilibria can be slightly different under different informational struc-
tures on Ki(vi, ci):
(1) vi is private information and ci is common knowledge to all bidders. In this
case, Ki(vi, ci) = Fi(vi). Campbell (1998), Tan and Yilankaya (2006) and Cao
and Tian (2013) studied this special case. The equilibrium is described by a
valuation cutoff v∗i for each bidder i. Bidder i submits a bid when vi ≥ v∗i .
(2) ci is private information and vi is common knowledge to all bidders. In this case,
Ki(vi, ci) = Gi(ci). Kaplan and Sela (2006) investigated this kind of economic
environment. The equilibrium is described by a cost cutoff point c∗i for each
bidder i. Bidder i submits a bid when ci ≤ c∗i .
3 The Existence of Equilibrium
Suppose, provisionally, there exists an equilibrium in which each bidder i uses c∗i (vi) as his
entrance decision making. Then for bidder i with value vi, when his participation cost ci ≤ c∗i (vi),
5There may exist an equilibrium in which bidders do not bid their true value when they participate. See the
special example constructed in Cao and Tian (2013).
6Lu and Sun (2007) showed that for any auction mechanism with participation costs, the participating and
nonparticipating types of any bidder are divided by a nondecreasing and equicontinuous shutdown curve.
7In equilibrium, c∗i (vi) depends on the distributions of all bidders’ valuations and participation costs.
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the bidder will participate in the auction and submit his weakly dominant bid, or else he will stay
out8. For bidder i, to submit a bid vi, he should participate in the auction first; i.e., ci ≤ c∗i (vi).
So the density of submitting a bid vi is
fc∗i (vi)(vi) =
∫ c∗i (vi)
0
ki(vi, ci)dci.
Remark 2 When vi and ci are independent, bidder i with value vi will submit the bid vi with
probability Gi(c
∗
i (vi)) and stay out with probability 1−Gi(c∗i (vi)).
fc∗i (vi)(0) refers to the probability (density) that bidder i does not submit a bid. Let Fc∗i (vi)(vi)
be the corresponding cumulative probability. Note that there is a mass at vi = 0 for Fc∗i (vi)(vi).
For each bidder i, let the maximal bid of the other bidders be mi. Note that, if mi > 0, at least
one of the other bidders participates in the auction. If mi = 0, no other bidders participates in
the auction.
The payoff of participating in the auction for bidder i with value vi is given by
∫ vi
0 (vi −
mi)d
∏
j 6=i Fc∗j (mi), and thus the zero expected net-payoff condition for bidder i to participate
in the auction when his valuation is vi requires that
c∗i (vi) =
∫ vi
0
(vi −mi)d
∏
j 6=i
Fc∗j (mi).
With some algebra derivations, we have
Lemma 1
c∗i (vi) =
∫ vi
0
∏
j 6=i
[1−
∫ 1
mi
∫ c∗j (τ)
0
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ]dmi. (1)
Remark 3 When vi and ci are independent, Ki(vi, ci) = Fi(vi)Gi(ci) and ki(vi, ci) = fi(vi)gi(ci),
we have
c∗i (vi) =
∫ vi
0
∏
j 6=i
[1−
∫ 1
mi
Gj(cj(τ))fj(τ)dτ ]dmi.
Taking derivative of equation (1) with respect to vi, we have
c∗i
′(vi) =
∏
j 6=i
[1−
∫ 1
vi
∫ c∗j (τ)
0
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ]. (2)
Notice that c∗i (0) = 0, thus the above equation is a functional differential equation with the
initial condition. Specially when vi and ci are independent,
c∗i
′(vi) =
∏
j 6=i
[1−
∫ 1
vi
Gj(c
∗
j (τ))fj(τ)dτ ].
8c∗i (vi) can be interpreted as the maximal amount that bidder i would like to pay to participate in the auction
when his value is vi.
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Lemma 2 c∗i (vi) has the following properties:
(i) c∗i (0) = 0.
(ii) 0 ≤ c∗i (vi) ≤ vi.
(iii) c∗i
′(1) = 1.
(iv)
dc∗i (vi)
dn < 0.
(v)
dc∗i (vi)
dvi
≥ 0 and d2c∗i (vi)
dv2i
≥ 0.
(i) means that, when bidder i’s value for the object is 0, the value of participating in the
auction for bidder i is zero and thus the cost cutoff point for the bidder to enter the auction is
zero. Then, as long as the bidder has participation cost bigger than zero, he will not participate
in the auction.
(ii) means that a bidder will not be willing to pay more than his value to participate in the
auction.
(iii) means that, when a bidder’s value is 1, the marginal willingness to pay to enter the
auction is 1. The intuition is that when his value for the object is 1, he will win the object
almost surely. Then the marginal willingness to pay is equal to the marginal increase in the
valuation.
(iv) states that the participation cutoff point is a nondecreasing function in the number of
bidders. As the number of bidders increases, the probability to win the object will decrease,
holding other things constant. More bidders will increase the competition among the bidders
and thus reduce the expected payoff.
(v) states that the marginal willingness to pay is positive and increasing. The intuition is
that when a bidder’s value increases, the probability of winning the auction increases. The
willingness to pay increases and so does the marginal willingness to pay.
Definition 1 For the economic environment under consideration, a cutoff curve equilibrium is
an n-dimensional plane comprised of (c∗1(v1), c∗2(v2), ...c∗n(vn)) that is a solution of the following
equation system:
(P1)

c∗1(v1) =
∫ v1
0
∏
j 6=1[1−
∫ 1
m1
∫ c∗j (τ)
0 kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ]dm1
c∗2(v2) =
∫ v2
0
∏
j 6=2[1−
∫ 1
m2
∫ c∗j (τ)
0 kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ]dm2
...
c∗n(vn) =
∫ vn
0
∏
j 6=n[1−
∫ 1
mn
∫ c∗j (τ)
0 kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ]dmn.
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The differential equation system above is a partial functional differential equation system,
but not a partial differential equation system. The derivative of c∗i (vi) at vi depends not only
on vi itself, but also on the future path of c
∗
i (vj) with j 6= i and vj ≥ vi. Besides, we have
multiple variables in the functional differential equation system, which increases the difficulty
to study the existence of equilibrium. To overcome this multiple variable problem, we transfer
the original differential equation system to the following integral equation system
(P2)

c∗1(v) =
∫ v
0
∏
j 6=1[1−
∫ 1
m1
∫ c∗j (τ)
0 kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ]dm1
c∗2(v) =
∫ v
0
∏
j 6=2[1−
∫ 1
m2
∫ c∗j (τ)
0 kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ]dm2
...
c∗n(v) =
∫ v
0
∏
j 6=n[1−
∫ 1
mn
∫ c∗j (τ)
0 kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ]dmn.
Lemma 3 Problem (P1) and problem (P2) are equivalently solvable in the sense that
(1), if (c∗1(v1), c∗2(v2), ..., c∗n(vn)) is a solution to problem (P1), then (c∗1(v), c∗2(v), ..., c∗n(v)) is a
solution to problem (P2).
(2), if (c∗1(v), c∗2(v), ..., c∗n(v)) is a solution to problem (P2), then (c∗1(v1), c∗2(v2), ..., c∗n(vn)) is a
solution to problem (P1).
Thus we have reduced the multiple variables functional differential equation system to a
single variable functional equation system. We then have the following result on the existence
of equilibrium (c∗1(v), c∗2(v), ...c∗n(v)):
Proposition 1 (The Existence Theorem) For the general economic environment under con-
sideration, the integral equation system (P2) has at least one solution (c∗1(v), c∗2(v), ...c∗n(v)); i.e.,
there is always an equilibrium in which every bidder i uses his own cutoff curve c∗i (v).
Remark 4 When vi and ci are independent, the equilibrium is an n-dimensional plane com-
posed of (c∗1(v), c∗2(v), ...c∗n(v)) that is a solution of the following integral equation system:
(P3)

c∗1(v) =
∫ v
0
∏
j 6=1[1−
∫ 1
m1
Gj(c
∗
j (τ))fj(τ)dτ ]dm1
c∗2(v) =
∫ v
0
∏
j 6=2[1−
∫ 1
m2
Gj(c
∗
j (τ))fj(τ)dτ ]dm2
...
c∗n(v) =
∫ v
0
∏
j 6=n[1−
∫ 1
mn
Gj(c
∗
j (τ))fj(τ)dτ ]dmn.
The above setting with two-dimensional private values and participation costs with general
distribution functions is very general and contains many existing results as special cases, as
discussed in Appendix C.
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4 Uniqueness of Equilibrium
To investigate the uniqueness of equilibrium c∗(v), we first consider the case where all bidders
are ex ante homogeneous in the sense that they have the same joint distribution functions of
valuations and participation costs and focus on the symmetric equilibrium in which all bidders
use the same cutoff curve.
(P2) can be rewritten as
c∗(v) =
∫ v
0
[1−
∫ 1
m
∫ c∗(τ)
0
kj(τ, c)dcdτ ]
n−1dm, (3)
and correspondingly we have
c∗′(v) = [1−
∫ 1
v
∫ c∗(τ)
0
k(τ, c)dcdτ ]n−1, c∗(0) = 0. (4)
We the have the following result.
Proposition 2 (Uniqueness of Symmetric Equilibrium) Suppose that all bidders have the
same distribution function K(v, c). There is a unique symmetric equilibrium at which each bidder
uses the same cutoff strategy.
Remark 5 Uniqueness of the symmetric equilibrium has been established in some special cases.
1) In Campbell (1998) and Tan and Yilankaya (2006), when bidders have the same
participation cost and continuously differentiable valuation distribution function,
there is a unique symmetric equilibrium in which each bidder uses a same cutoff
point vs for his entrance decision making.
2) In Kaplan and Sela (2006), when all bidders have the same valuations for the
object and continuously differentiable participation cost distribution functions,
there is a unique symmetric cutoff point c∗.
3) Earlier, Laffont and Green (1984) investigated the existence of equilibria when
both valuations and participation costs are uniformly distributed. They got the
uniqueness of the symmetric equilibrium under the simple two-dimensional eco-
nomic environment. However, their proof is incomplete.
Remark 6 Note that the above proposition only shows the uniqueness of symmetric equilibrium
when bidders are ex ante homogeneous. It does not exclude the possibility of asymmetric
equilibrium. As shown by counter-example in Campbell (1998), Tan and Yilankaya (2006),
Kaplan and Sela (2006), there are asymmetric equilibria where ex ante homogeneous bidders
use different cutoff strategy, which means the equilibria are not unique.
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As such, generally the uniqueness of equilibrium cannot be guaranteed (we will also discuss
this in the next section). However, for an economy with only two bidders and independent
participation costs and valuations, we can have the uniqueness result.
To show this, write corresponding functional differential equation system as:
(P6)
 c∗1
′(v) = [1− ∫ 1v G2(c∗2(τ))f2(τ)dτ ], c∗1(0) = 0,
c∗2
′(v) = [1− ∫ 1v G1(c∗1(τ))f1(τ)dτ ], c∗2(0) = 0.
We then have the following result.
Proposition 3 (Uniqueness of Equilibrium) In the two-bidder economy whereGi(c) is con-
tinuously differentiable on [0, 1] and δi = maxc gi(c), there is a unique equilibrium when δi
∫ 1
0 (1−
Fi(s))ds < 1.
WhenGi(ci) is uniform on [0, 1], δi = 1 and
∫ 1
0 (1−Fi(s))ds < 1, we have a unique equilibrium.
Especially, when bidders are ex ante homogeneous, the unique equilibrium is symmetric. To see
this, consider the following examples.
Example 1 Now we assume Gi(c) and Fi(v) are both uniform on [0, 1]. At equilibrium we have
c∗1
′(v) = 1−
∫ 1
v
c∗2(τ)dτ,
c∗2
′(v) = 1−
∫ 1
v
c∗1(τ)dτ.
Then c∗1
′′(v) = c∗2(v) and c∗2
′′(v) = c∗1(v). Thus we have c∗1
(4)(v) = c∗1(v) and c∗2
(4)(v) = c∗2(v)
with c∗1(0) = 0, c∗1
′(1) = 1, c∗2(0) = 0 and c∗2
′(1) = 1. One can check that the only equilibrium is
c∗1(v) = c∗2(v) = aev − ae−v, where a = ee2+1 .
5 Discussions
There are in general multiple equilibria. Examples can be found in Campbell (1998), Tan and
Yilankaya (2006), Cao and Tian (2013) and Kaplan and Sela (2006) where either participation
costs or valuations are common knowledge. In this section we provide an example for the
multiplicity of equilibria when both participation costs and valuations are private information.
Suppose the support of vi and ci to be [0, 1]× [, δ], where [, δ] is a subset of [0, 1] and  > 0.
To investigate the existence of equilibrium, we construct a new density function k˜i(vi, ci) with
support [0, 1] × [0, 1] which has the same density as ki(vi, ci) on the interval [0, 1] × [, δ] and
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0 otherwise and K˜i(vi, ci) is the corresponding cumulative density function. The same as in
Section 3, the equilibrium cutoff curve for individual i, i ∈ 1, 2, ...n, is given by
c∗i (vi) =
∫ vi
0
∏
j 6=i
[1−
∫ 1
mi
∫ c∗j (τ)
0
k˜j(τ, cj)dcjdτ ]dmi,
with
c∗i
′(vi) =
∏
j 6=i
[1−
∫ 1
vi
∫ c∗j (τ)
0
k˜j(τ, cj)dcjdτ ]. (5)
By the fixed point theorem, an equilibrium exists. However, the uniqueness of the equilibrium
cannot be guaranteed. Specially, when bidders are ex ante homogeneous, asymmetric equilibria
may exist.
One special type of asymmetric equilibrium is that some bidders may never participate in
the auction. This can happen when the support of participation costs, c, has non-zero lower
bound. One implication of such equilibrium is that in this economic environment, some of the
bidders can form a collusion to enter the auction regressively so that they can prevent some
others entering the auction and thus can reduce the competition among those who participate
in the auction, which in turn will increase the benefits from participating.
The expected payoff of participating in the auction is a non-decreasing function of one’s true
value. Thus the sufficient and necessary condition for a bidder to never participate is that when
his value is 1, participating in the auction still gives him an expected payoff that is less than
the minimum participation cost, , given the strategies of other bidders. Formally, suppose in
equilibrium, a subset A = {1, 2, . . . , k} ⊂ {1, 2, 3 . . . , n} of bidders choose to participate in the
auction when their valuations are large enough and bidders in B = {k + 1, . . . , n} choose never
to participate in the auction. Then for all i ∈ A we have
c∗i (vi) =
∫ vi
0
∏
j 6=i,j∈A
[1−
∫ 1
mi
∫ c∗j (τ)
0
k˜j(τ, cj)dcjdτ ]dmi.
For bidders in B to never participate, it is required that for all j ∈ B,
c∗j (1) =
∫ 1
0
∏
i∈A
[1−
∫ 1
mj
∫ c∗i (τ)
0
k˜i(τ, cj)dcjdτ ]dmj < ,
which raises a requirement for the lower and upper bound of the participation costs and the
distributions of valuations and participation costs. To see this, we assume that there are only
two bidders and vi and ci are independent. The distribution functions are F (vi) and G(ci)
separately.
Suppose bidder 2 never participates, then bidder 1 enters if and only if v1 ≥ c1 and thus
we have c∗1(v1) = v1. Given this, the expected payoff of bidder 2 when he participates in the
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auction is
F () +
∫ δ

[(1− v2)G(v2) + (1−G(v2))]dF (v2) +
∫ 1
δ
(1− v2)dF (v2)
when v2 = 1. We have three terms in the above equation. When bidder 1’s value is less than
, he will not enter the auction and bidder 2 will get payoff 1, and the probability is F (). The
second term is the payoff when bidder 1’s value is between  and δ. For any v2 ∈ (, δ), bidder
2’s payoff is 1− v2 when bidder 1 participates and is 1 when bidder 1 does not participate, and
the probabilities are G(v2) and 1−G(v2) separately. The third term is the payoff when bidder
1’s value is greater than δ and in this case bidder 1 participates for sure.
In order to have a corner equilibrium, we need
F () +
∫ δ

[(1− v2)G(v2) + (1−G(v2))]dF (v2) +
∫ 1
δ
(1− v2)dF (v2) < . (6)
It can be seen that in the two homogeneous bidders economy, when F (·) is concave, there is no
corner equilibrium. To see this, note that when F (·) is concave, we have F (vi) ≥ vi, equation
(6) cannot hold; i.e., corner equilibrium does not exist.
Remark 7 If  = δ; i.e., ci is common knowledge to all bidders, (6) can be simplified to
F () +
∫ 1
 (1− v2)dF (v2) < ; i.e., F () +
∫ 1
 F (v2)dv2 < .
Example 2 Assume vi and ci to be jointly uniformly distributed (then they are independent)
and there are only two bidders. Suppose bidder 2 never participates. We have c∗1(v1) = v1, and
thus
c∗2
′(v2) = 1−
∫ 1
v2
G(c1(τ))dτ = 1−
∫ 1
v2
min{1,max{τ − 
δ −  , 0}}dτ,
which leads to
c∗2
′(v2) =

1− ∫ δ τ−δ−dτ − ∫ 1δ dτ = +δ2 if v2 < 
δ − δ2−2δ−v22+2v22(δ−) =
δ2+v22−2v2
2(δ−) if  ≤ v2 < δ
v2 if v2 ≥ δ
.
Given the above and the initial condition c∗2(0) = 0, we have
c∗2(v2) =

+δ
2 v2 if v2 < 
v32−3v22−3+3δ2v2
6(δ−) if  ≤ v2 < δ
δ2+δ+2+3v22
6 if v2 ≥ δ
.
For bidder 2 to never participate, we need c∗2(1) =
δ2+δ+2+3
6 ≤ , which is equivalent to
2 + (δ − 6)+ δ2 + 3 ≤ 0. Therefore, when
(6− δ)−√−3(δ2 + 4δ − 8)
2
≤  ≤ (6− δ) +
√−3(δ2 + 4δ − 8)
2
,
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the required condition is satisfied. For this to be true, we need
(6−δ)−
√
−3(δ2+4δ−8)
2 < δ and thus
δ2 − 2δ + 1 < 0, which cannot be true.
However, when F (·) is strictly convex, given proper  and δ, there may be an equilibrium in
which one bidder never participates while the other enters the auction whenever his valuation is
greater than his participation cost. As an illustration, suppose F (vi) = v
2
i and G(ci) is uniformly
distributed on [, δ]. (6) becomes
δ3 + δ2 + δ2+ 3 + 2
6
< .
One can check that when  = 0.5 and δ = 0.744, there exists an asymmetric equilibrium.
The other special type of asymmetric equilibrium is that when the lower bound of valuation
is positive, one bidder always participates. To see this, suppose the ci is distributed on [cl, ch]
with distribution Gi(ci) and vi is distributed on [vl, vh] with distribution Fi(vi), assuming vh >
vl > ch > cl. Suppose also we have an equilibrium in which bidder 1 always enters and bidder 2
never participates. Then bidder 1 always participates is a best response. For bidder 2’s strategy
to be a best response, we need ∫ vh
vl
(vh − v1)dF1(v1)− cl < 0,
the maximum expected payoff is less than the lowest participation cost. Using integration by
parts we have ∫ vh
vl
F1(v1)dv1 < cl.
One sufficient condition for this to be true is vh − vl < cl.
6 Conclusion
This paper investigates equilibria of second price auctions in economic environments with general
distribution functions when values and participation costs are both privately informed. We
show that there always exists an equilibrium cutoff strategy for each bidder. Moreover, when
all bidders are ex ante homogeneous, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium. In a simple
two-bidder economy, a sufficient condition for the uniqueness of the equilibrium is identified.
We also show that multiple equilibria may exist. Specifically, when bidders are ex ante ho-
mogeneous, there may also exist an asymmetric equilibrium at which one bidder always partici-
pates or never participates. Future research may be focused on identifying sufficient conditions
to guarantee the uniqueness of equilibrium for more general economic environments.
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Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1:
If mi = 0, none of the other bidders will participate, the probability of which is∏
j 6=i
Fc∗j (0) =
∏
j 6=i
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
c∗j (τ)
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ.
Otherwise, at least one other bidder submits a bid. Then∏
j 6=i
Fc∗j (mi) =
∏
j 6=i
[1−
∫ 1
mi
∫ c∗j (τ)
0
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ].
Thus, the cutoff curve for individual i, i ∈ 1, 2, ...n, can be characterized by
c∗i (vi) =
∫ vi
0
(vi −mi)d
∏
j 6=i
[1−
∫ 1
mi
∫ c∗j (τ)
0
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ] + vi
∏
j 6=i
[
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
c∗j (τ)
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ].
With integrating by parts, we have
c∗i (vi) =
∫ vi
0
(vi −mi)d
∏
j 6=i
[1−
∫ 1
mi
∫ c∗j (τ)
0
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ] + vi
∏
j 6=i
[
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
c∗j (τ)
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ]
= (vi −mi)
∏
j 6=i
[1−
∫ 1
mi
∫ c∗j (τ)
0
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ] |vi0 +vi
∏
j 6=i
[
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
c∗j (τ)
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ]
+
∫ vi
0
∏
j 6=i
[1−
∫ 1
mi
∫ c∗j (τ)
0
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ]dmi
= −vi
∏
j 6=i
[1−
∫ 1
0
∫ c∗j (τ)
0
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ] + vi
∏
j 6=i
[
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
c∗j (τ)
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ]
+
∫ vi
0
∏
j 6=i
[1−
∫ 1
mi
∫ c∗j (τ)
0
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ]dmi.
Since ∫ 1
0
∫ c∗j (τ)
0
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ +
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
c∗j (τ)
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ = 1,
we have
c∗i (vi) =
∫ vi
0
∏
j 6=i
[1−
∫ 1
mi
∫ c∗j (τ)
0
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ]dmi.
Proof of Lemma 2:
Proof: (i) Letting vi = 0 in the expression of c
∗
i (vi), we have the result.
(ii) Since
c∗i (vi) =
∫ vi
0
∏
j 6=i
[1−
∫ 1
mi
∫ c∗j (τ)
0
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ]dmi 6
∫ vi
0
dvi = vi
14
by the nonnegativity of
∫ c∗j (τ)
0 kj(τ, cj)dcj and∫ 1
mi
∫ c∗j (τ)
0
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ≤
∫ 1
mi
∫ 1
0
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ≤
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ = 1,
we have 0 ≤ c∗i (vi) ≤ vi.
(iii) Letting vi = 1 in (5), we have the result.
(iv) Since n is the number of bidders, as n increases, say, from n to n + 1, the prod-
uct term inside the integral will be increased by one more term. Also, note that 0 < 1 −∫ 1
mi
∫ c∗j (τ)
0 kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ < 1. So given more bidders, c
∗
i (vi) will decrease.
(v)
dc∗i (vi)
dvi
=
∏
j 6=i
[1−
∫ 1
vi
∫ c∗j (τ)
0
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ] ≥ 0
by noting that ∫ 1
vi
∫ c∗j (τ)
0
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ≤
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
kj(τ, cj)dcjd = 1.
We then have
d2c∗i (vi)
dv2i
=
∑
k 6=i
∏
j 6=i,j 6=k
[1−
∫ 1
vi
∫ c∗j (τ)
0
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ]
∫ c∗k(vi)
0
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ≥ 0.
Proof of Lemma 3:
Proof: Suppose (c∗1(v1), c∗2(v2), ..., c∗n(vn)) is a solution to problem (P1), then we have for any
i ∈ {1, 2, ...n},
c∗i (vi) =
∫ vi
0
∏
j 6=i
[1−
∫ 1
mi
∫ c∗j (τ)
0
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ]dmi,
then by changing the variable vi to v we have
c∗i (v) =
∫ v
0
∏
j 6=i
[1−
∫ 1
mi
∫ c∗j (τ)
0
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ]dmi
for all i ∈ {1, 2, ...n}. So (c∗1(v), c∗2(v), ..., c∗n(v)) is a solution to (P2). On the contrary, if
(c∗1(v), c∗2(v), ..., c∗n(v)) is a solution to (P2), then we have for any i ∈ {1, 2, ...n},
c∗i (v) =
∫ v
0
∏
j 6=i
[1−
∫ 1
mi
∫ c∗j (τ)
0
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ]dmi.
Then by changing the variable v to vi in the i
th equation we have
c∗i (vi) =
∫ vi
0
∏
j 6=i
[1−
∫ 1
mi
∫ c∗j (τ)
0
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ]dmi.
Thus (c∗1(v1), c∗2(v2), ..., c∗n(vn)) is a solution to (P1).
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Proof of Proposition 1:
Let hi(mi, c
∗) =
∏
j 6=i[1 −
∫ 1
mi
∫ c∗j (τ)
0 kj(τ, c)dcdτ ]. Since kj(τ, c) is integrable over c as it is
a density function, there exists a continuous function γj(τ, c) with
∂γj(τ,c)
∂c = kj(τ, c) such that∫ c∗j (τ)
0 kj(τ, c)dc = γj(τ, c
∗
j (τ))−γj(τ, 0). Thus hi(mi, c∗) =
∏
j 6=i[1−
∫ 1
mi
[γj(τ, c
∗
j (τ))−γj(τ, 0)]dτ ],
which is a continuous mapping from [0, 1]× [0, 1]n → [0, 1].
LetH(m, c∗) = (h1(m1, c∗), h2(m2, c∗), · · · , hn(mn, c∗))′, which is a continuous mapping from
[0, 1]n × [0, 1]n → [0, 1]n. By Lemma 2, H is bounded above by one. Define
M = {c ∈ ϕ |: ‖c‖ ≤ 1},
where ϕ is the space of continuous function φ defined on [0, 1]n → [0, 1]n with ‖c‖ = sup0≤v≤1 c(v).
Then by Ascoli Theorem, M is compact. M is clearly convex. Define an operator P : M →M
by
(Pc)(v) =
∫ v
0
H(s, c(.))ds
Then, by Lemma 2, P is a continuous function from M to itself. Thus, by Schauder-Tychonoff
Fixed-point Theorem, there exists a fixed point; i.e., a solution for the functional differential
equation system exists.
Proof of Proposition 2:
Proof: The existence of the symmetric equilibrium can be established by the Schauder-Tychonoff
Fixed-point Theorem. Here we only need to prove the uniqueness of the symmetric equilibrium.
Suppose not, by way of contradiction, we have two different symmetric equilibria x(v) and y(v)
to the economic environment we consider. Then we have
x′(v) = [1−
∫ 1
v
∫ x(τ)
0
k(τ, c)dcdτ ]n−1
y′(v) = [1−
∫ 1
v
∫ y(τ)
0
k(τ, c)dcdτ ]n−1.
Suppose x(1) > y(1), then by the continuity of x(v) and y(v) we can find a v∗ such that
x(v∗) = y(v∗) = c(v∗) and x(v) > y(v) for all v ∈ (v∗, 1] by noting that x(0) = y(0).
Case 1: If k(v, c) > 0 with positive probability measure on (v∗, 1) × (c(v∗), 1), then for
τ ∈ (v∗, 1] we have ∫ x(τ)
0
k(τ, c)dc >
∫ y(τ)
0
k(τ, c)dc
for τ ∈ (v∗, 1). Then we have x′(v∗) < y′(v∗) which is a contradiction to x(v) > y(v) for v > v∗.
So we have x(1) = y(1).
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Now suppose there exists an interval [α, β] ⊂ [0, 1] such that x(α) = y(lα) and x(β) = y(β)
while for all v ∈ (α, β), x(v) > y(v) and for all v ∈ [β, 1], x(v) = y(v), by the same logic above,
we have x(β) = y(β) and x′(v) < y′(v) for v ∈ (α, β), which is inconsistent with x(v) > y(v)
for all v ∈ (α, β). Thus we can prove that x(v) = y(v) for all v ∈ [0, 1] and so the symmetric
equilibrium is unique.
Case 2: If k(v, c) > 0 with zero probability measure on (v∗, 1) × (c(v∗), 1), then we have
x′(v) = y′(v) for all v ∈ (v∗, 1]. By x(v∗) = y(v∗) we have x(v) = y(v) for all v > v∗, which is a
contradiction to x(v) > y(v). Thus there is a unique symmetric equilibrium.
Then in both cases we prove that there is a unique symmetric equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 3:
Proof: Define a mapping
(Pc)(v) =
∫ v
0
ds−
∫ v
0
∫ 1
s
 0 f1(τ)
f2(τ) 0
 G1(c1(τ))
G2(c2(τ))
 dτds,
where c = (c1, c2)
′.
Take any x(v) = (x1(v), x2(v))
′ and y(v) = (y1(v), y2(v))′ with x(v), y(v) ∈ ϕ where ϕ is the
space of monotonic increasing continuous functions defined on [0, 1]→ [0, 1]. Then we have
|(Px)(v)− (Py)(v)| ≤
∫ v
0
∫ 1
s
 0 g1(x̂1(τ))f1(τ)
g2(x̂2(τ))f2(τ) 0
 |
 x1(τ)− y1(τ)
x2(τ)− y2(τ)
 |dτds
=
∫ v
0
∫ 1
s
 0 g1(x̂1(τ))f1(τ)
g2(x̂2(τ))f2(τ) 0
 dτds sup
0<v≤1
|x(v)− y(v)|
≤
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
s
 0 g1(x̂1(τ))f1(τ)
g2(x̂2(τ))f2(τ) 0
 dτds sup
0<v≤1
|x(v)− y(v)|
≤
∫ 1
0
 0 δ1(1− F1(s))
δ2(1− F2(s)) 0
 ds sup
0<v≤1
|x(v)− y(v)|, (7)
where the first equality comes from mean value theorem, x̂i(τ) is some number between xi(τ)
and yi(τ), and δi is the maximum of gi(c), i = 1, 2. Thus when δi
∫ 1
0 (1−Fi(s))ds < 1, the above
mapping is a contraction, so there exists a unique equilibrium.
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Appendix B
Problematic Details in Green and Laffont (1984):
In their proof of Lemma 3 (Economics Letters, 16, (1984), 34-35), they first showed the following
inequality
(a− b)n ≤ (a− b) n
2n
if a ≤ 1
2
, b ≤ 1
2
.
After they get the following expression on page 35,
F (λt+1(θ))− F (λt(θ)) =
∫ θ
0
{[1−
∫ 1
m
λt+1(τ)dτ ]n−1 − [1−
∫ 1
m
λt(τ)dτ ]n−1}dm,
they apply the above inequality to reach
‖F (λt+1(.))− F (λt(.))‖ < 1/2‖λt+1(.)− λt(.)‖
which can not pass through since now a = 1 − ∫ 1m λt+1(τ)dτ ≥ 12 and b = 1 − ∫ 1m λt(τ)dτ ≥ 12
and so an−1 + ban−2 + · · · + bn−2a + bn−1 is not necessary less than 1, which implies that the
Banach fixed point theorem cannot be applied.
Appendix C
Special Cases of the General Model:
In this part, for simplicity, we assume vi and ci are independent to illustrate the generality of
our setting in the main body of the paper.
Case 1. Suppose there is a subset, denoted by A, of bidders whose valuations are common
knowledge. Then for all i ∈ A¯ = N \A, we have
c∗i (v) =
∫ v
0
∏
j∈A¯\{i}
[1−
∫ 1
mi
Gj(c
∗
j (τ))fj(τ)dτ ]
∏
j∈A\{i},vj>v
[1−Gj(c∗j (vj))]
×
∏
j∈A¯\{i},vj<v
[1−
∫ 1
mi
Gj(c
∗
j (τ))fj(τ)dτ ]dmi.
For all i ∈ A,
c∗i (vi) =
∫ vi
0
∏
j∈A¯\{i}
[1−
∫ 1
mi
Gj(c
∗
j (τ))fj(τ)dτ ]
∏
j∈A\{i},vj>vi
[1−Gj(c∗j (vj))]
×
∏
j∈A\{i},vj<vi
[1−
∫ 1
mi
Gj(c
∗
j (τ))fj(τ)dτ ]dmi.
In this case, one needs to distinguish the difference between vi > vj and vj > vi, since under
these two situations the expected payoff has different expressions.
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Example 3 Suppose n = 2 and v1 < v2 is common knowledge, we have two bidders. Then for
the bidder with value v1,
c∗2(v2) =
∫ v2
0
[1−
∫ 1
m2
G1(c
∗
1(τ))f1(τ)dτ ]dm2
=
∫ v1
0
[1−
∫ 1
m2
G1(c
∗
1(τ))f1(τ)dτ ]dm2
+
∫ v2
v1
[1−
∫ 1
m2
G1(c
∗
1(τ))f1(τ)dτ ]dm2
= v1(1−G1(c∗1(v1))) + (v2 − v1),
and
c∗1(v1) =
∫ v1
0
[1−
∫ 1
m1
G2(c
∗
2(τ))f2(τ)dτ ]dm1
=
∫ v1
0
[1−G2(c∗2(v2)]dm1 = v1(1−G2(c∗2(v2))),
which can be reduced to the formula obtained in Kaplan and Sela (2006) when the cost distri-
bution functions are the same.
Case 2. On the contrary, suppose there is a subset, denoted by B, of bidders whose
participation costs are common knowledge, as discussed in Campbell (1998), Tan and Yilankaya
(2006) and Cao and Tian (2007). Let A¯ = N \A. Then, for all i ∈ N , we have
c∗i (vi) =
∫ vi
0
∏
j∈B\{i}
[1−
∫ 1
mi
Gj(c
∗
j (τ))fj(τ)dτ ]
∏
j∈B¯\{i}
[1−
∫ 1
mi
Gj(c
∗
j (τ))fj(τ)dτ ]dmi
=
∫ vi
0
∏
j∈B\{i}
[1−
∫ 1
m∗j
Gj(c
∗
j (τ))fj(τ)dτ ]
∏
j∈B¯\{i}
[1−
∫ 1
mj
Gj(c
∗
j (τ))fj(τ)dτ ]dmi
=
∫ vi
0
∏
j∈B\{i},mj>v
[1−
∫ 1
mj
Gj(c
∗
j (τ))fj(τ)dτ ]
∏
j∈B\{i},mj<v
[1−
∫ 1
mj
Gj(c
∗
j (τ))fj(τ)dτ ]
×
∏
j∈B¯\{i}
[1−
∫ 1
mi
Gj(c
∗
j (τ))fj(τ)dτ ]dmi,
where m∗j is determined by c
∗
j (mj) = cj for j ∈ B. It may be remarked that c∗i (vi) may have
different functional forms when vi is in the different regions of vi > m
∗
j and vi ≤ m∗j .
Example 4 Consider an economic environment with two bidders whose values are drawn from
the same continuous distribution function F (v). Bidders’ participation costs are common knowl-
edge and the same, c1 = c2 = c. This is an economy studied in Campbell (1998) and Tan and
Yilankaya (2006) for n = 2. Let c∗1(m∗1) = c∗2(m∗2) = c.
19
Then for bidder 1, we have
c∗1(vi) =
∫ vi
0
[1−
∫ 1
m1
G(c∗2(τ))f(τ)dm1]dτ.
As such, we have
c∗1(v1) =
∫ v1
0
[1−
∫ 1
m∗2
G(c∗2(τ))f(τ)dm1]dτ = F (m
∗
2)v1
when v1 < m
∗
2, and
c∗1(v1) =
∫ m∗2
0
[1−
∫ 1
m∗2
G(c∗2(τ))f(τ)dm1]dτ +
∫ v1
m∗2
[1−
∫ 1
m∗2
G(c∗2(τ))f(τ)dm1]dτ
= F (m∗2)m
∗
2 +
∫ v1
m∗2
F (m1)dm1
when v1 ≥ m∗2.
Similarly, for bidder 2, we have
c∗2(v2) =
∫ v2
0
[1−
∫ 1
m2
G(c∗1(τ))f(τ)dτ ]dm2.
Then, we have c∗2(v2) = F (m∗1)v2 when v2 < m∗1, and c∗2(v2) = F (m∗1)m∗1 +
∫ v2
m∗1
F (m2)dm2 when
v2 ≥ m∗1.
We can use these equations to find the cutoff points. It is clear that there is a symmetric
equilibrium in which both bidders use the same cutoff point m∗1 = m∗2 = m∗, which satisfies the
equation
m∗F (m∗) = c.
Indeed, by the monotonicity of m∗F (m∗), the symmetric equilibrium exists and is unique.
Now if we provisionally suppose that m∗1 < m∗2, then we should have
c∗1(m
∗
1) = m
∗
1F (m
∗
2) = c,
and
c∗2(m
∗
2) = m
∗
1F (m
∗
1) +
∫ m∗2
m∗1
F (m2)dm2 = c.
Tan and Yilankaya (2006) showed that when F (v) is strictly convex, there exists m∗1 < m∗2
satisfying the above two equations.
We can use Figure 1 to illustrate the equilibria in Example 4. There are three curves in the
graph. The middle curve indicates both bidders use the same cutoff point c∗(v), and then have
the same cutoff point m∗. The highest curve is bidder 1’s reaction curve c∗1(v1). There is a kink
at v1 = m
∗
2. Before reaching this point, the curve is a straight line passing through the original
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Figure 1: Symmetric & Asymmetric Equilibrium with 2 Bidders
point with slope F (m∗2). Beyond m∗2, it is a smooth curve with the slope changing along the
curve, which is F (v). We can see as v → 1, the slope goes to 1, which is consistent with the
properties of the cutoff curves described in Lemma 2. The lowest curve is bidder 2’s reaction
curve c∗2(v2). The equilibrium is the intersection of the horizontal line c and each bidder’s cutoff
curve.
Case 3. When all participation costs are zero, Gi(c
∗
i (τ)) = 1 for all τ and all i. Then
c∗i (v) =
∫ v
0
∏
j 6=i
[1−
∫ 1
mi
fj(τ)dτ ]dmi =
∫ v
0
∏
j 6=i
Fj(mi)dmi > 0,
and thus, a bidder with positive value for the object will always participate in the auction and
submit a bid. Under this circumstance the entrance equilibrium curve is unique.
Case 4. When all participation costs are 1, Gj(c
∗
j (τ)) = 0 for all c
∗
j (τ) < 1, and thus
c∗i
′(v) = 1. Considering the initial condition, we have c∗i (vi) = vi, i.e., a bidder with value vi
would like to pay at most vi to enter the auction. Now since the designed participation cost is
1 for all bidders, then there will be no one participating in the auction.
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